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Abstract
We study a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer, where the supplier uses a simple
and easily implementable incentive scheme - making a side payment - to influence the retailer’s ordering plan.
The supplier makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the retailer in the form of a menu of contracts, each consisting of
a procurement plan plus a side payment. The retailer, who possesses private information about customer demand
and his cost parameters, either accepts one of the contracts or imposes his own optimal plan. We formulate the
supplier’s problem of designing optimal contracts with the realistic assumption that the retailer’s outside option
depends on his private information. Taking into account the retailer’s reaction to the proposed offer, the supplier
faces a nested (bi-level) optimization problem, which we transform into a single-level mixed integer programming
formulation. In our analysis, we use a network interpretation for the set of incentive constraints and show some
properties of optimal contracts. This enables us to considerably reduce the number of incentive constraints and to
find optimal values of the side payment quantities. Our findings regarding the possible behavior of the opportunistic
retailer deviate from those of previous studies as a result of considering more realistic assumptions.
Keywords Supply chain contracting, coordination mechanisms, lot-sizing, asymmetric information.
1 INTRODUCTION
A supply chain (SC) generally consists of separate, individual members with different preferences and objec-
tives, making decisions autonomously and striving to meet their own local objectives. Such selfish, opportunistic
behavior can lead to suboptimal performance of the whole SC. The loss of efficiency because of the opportunistic
behavior of SC members is referred to as the “price of anarchy” in the literature (Perakis & Roels 2007).
To overcome SC inefficiencies and reduce the price of anarchy, a single, central decision-maker in a so-called
centralized SC can optimize overall SC performance, e.g., maximize the profits realized at each level of the SC
by fulfilling customer demand. This solution is, however, not without problems. First, the centralized solution
may not necessarily be in the best interest of every individual SC member; some members may incur significant
losses, while others may earn substantial profits. As a result, autonomous members may seek to meet their
own individual objectives, rather than those of the entire SC system. Second, to be able to fully integrate and
control the SC system, the central decision-maker needs to have access to all SC information, such as the market
demand for the final product, inventory level, and cost/profit structure of each individual member. Access to such
comprehensive information rarely happens in reality, and it is likely that no two members possess comparable
information. One member may have a better forecast of demand than another, or a member may possess superior
information regarding the costs and operating procedures of other members. Third, the idea of a centralized SC
2system being controlled by only a single decision-maker is not a viable option because it is usually costly and
carries noticeable risks, in addition to being difficult to administer.
Given the decentralized nature and existence of information asymmetry (IA) in most real-world supply chains, it
is important to coordinate decisions and activities of individual SC members in order to improve the performance
of the whole SC and reduce the price of anarchy. This paper considers a typical two-echelon SC, consisting of a
supplier who serves a retailer with a single product. The retailer faces an economic lot sizing (ELS) problem to
find an ordering plan that maximizes his total profit of satisfying customer demand. The supplier also faces an
ELS problem to find a production plan that maximizes the total profit earned by fulfilling the retailer’s orders.
In our SC, the retailer has the market power to impose his optimal ordering plan on the supplier. Large and
financially successful retailers, such as Wal-Mart, whose large-share suppliers depend on the retailer’s broad
market reach to maintain their sales volumes and strengthen their market positions (Bloom & Perry 2001),
constitute real-world examples of such an imbalanced power relationship.
To persuade the strong retailer to choose an ordering plan that accords with the supplier’s cost structure, rather
than the retailer’s individual optimal plan, the supplier can pay a side payment to the retailer. To determine a
side payment sufficient to influence the retailer’s behavior, the supplier needs to know the cost/profit function
and external demand at the retailer’s end. In general, the supplier does not have access to such information about
the retailer, and the retailer may use his private information strategically.
In this paper, we formulate the problem of designing optimal contracts from the supplier’s perspective under
three conditions: (a) no IA, (b) IA across one dimension (the retailer’s cost type), and (c) IA across two dimensions
(the retailer’s cost(s) type and customer demand). Although the individual SC members make their procurement
decisions independently of each other, the profit they realize depends not only on their own decisions, but also
on the decisions of the other SC members. Such a separate, interactive decision-making approach requires the
supplier to take into account the retailer’s reaction to his proposed offer. This corresponds to a nested (bi-level)
optimization problem for the supplier, which we transform into a single-level Mixed Integer Programming (MIP)
model.
In the analysis of models with IA, we use a natural network interpretation for the set of incentive compatibility
constraints and show some properties of optimal contracts. This allows us to considerably simplify the set of
incentive compatibility constraints; rather than working through a large set of constraints, we can focus our
attention on a more tractable set. Additionally, to find the optimal side payment quantities we only need to
consider constraints that correspond to paths in the relevant network.
An important feature of our study is the dependence between the retailer’s outside option (Muthoo 1999)
and his private information. That is, we drop the simplifying assumption, prevalent in the mechanism design
literature, that retailer types with different private information share an identical reservation profit. This departure
from the previous literature is particularly important as we also consider more than one dimension of IA and a
discrete type space for each dimension. Our more realistic assumption together with the considered IA setting
3enables us to present unexpected results with respect to the possible behavior of the opportunistic retailer.
An interesting property of the optimal solution in the one-dimensional setting corresponds to a well-known
result in the mechanism design literature that an inefficient type (e.g., the one with the higher cost) does not
pretend to be efficient (e.g., lower cost) in order to gain a larger part of the efficiency gain. We, however, show
that the information rents are not necessarily monotonic and therefore the inefficient type may make profit by
pretending to be efficient.
In the two-dimensional cost uncertainty case and considering a binary type space for each dimension with
equal probability for each type, we show that a type that is inefficient in two dimensions (e.g., high set-up
and holding cost) may pretend to be efficient in both dimensions and the other way around. It is, however, not
profitable for a low set-up cost and high holding cost to pretend to have high set-up and low holding cost and
vice versa. It was previously shown in the literature that a retailer who is strong in one dimension (e.g., high
demand) but weak (e.g., high cost) in the other would sometimes prefer a situation where his weak dimension
is known to the supplier to a situation where both dimensions are private information. With an example, we
demonstrate that it might be in the interest of a retailer type who is strong in both dimensions that one of the
dimensions is known to the supplier.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, Section 2 provides a review of the relevant SC
coordination literature. Next, we present a sequence of models, starting from the simple one, and getting more
complex as we proceed. The model for deriving the individual optimal procurement plan of the two SC members
is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes the SC optimal procurement plan from the viewpoint of a central
decision-maker. The model for the decentralized SC system, in which there is no IA between the retailer
and supplier, is discussed in Section 5. The formulation and network interpretation of the supplier’s problem
of designing optimal contract menus with one and two dimensions of IA is discussed in Sections 6 and 7,
respectively. The paper ends with a conclusion in Section 8.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Although there is a vast body of literature on coordination of different SC settings, we restrict our review
to some of the relevant studies, dealing with the coordination problem with IA. To classify the prior research
on SC coordination, a distinction is made based on the nature of customer demand: deterministic and constant,
deterministic but dynamic, and stochastic demand.
The focus of one strand of research in SC coordination is on the economic order quantity (EOQ) setting where
demand and cost parameters are independent of time and the time horizon has a continuous scale of infinite
length. Corbett & de Groote (2000) developed a screening model with IA on the buyer’s holding cost which has
a continuous type space. The supplier, who follows a lot-for-lot policy, offers a menu of price-quantity contracts
to maximize his own profit. Sucky (2006) argued that the problem of IA in this model is actually eliminated as
the supplier can derive the buyer’s holding cost by knowing his EOQ and ordering cost. Sucky (2006) presented
a screening model with IA on both the holding and ordering costs of the buyer wherein the reservation values
4of the two buyer types are not identical. The seller pays a side payment to influence the buyer’s ordering plan.
Another class of research in a deterministic but non-stationary demand environment uses the ELS model as the
basic model for coordination. Dudek & Stadtler (2005) developed a negotiation-based model for synchronizing
plans between a buyer and a supplier in which both SC members use MIP models to generate their offers.
Later, the same authors extended this work in Dudek & Stadtler (2007) by considering a SC consisting of one
supplier and several buyers who face a capacitated lot-sizing model to generate their offers and the amount of
information exchanged between parties is further reduced.
There are also some studies in the class of stochastic models, addressing the SC coordination problem. Ha
(2001) used the setting of the newsvendor model, where demand is stochastic and price sensitive. The author
provided a screening model where the supplier does not know the buyer’s marginal cost and assumes a continuous
type space for the marginal cost. The paper showed that it is not possible to implement an optimal solution of
the complete information case. In a single-period setting, Özer & Wei (2006) analyzed the problem of credible
information sharing between a supplier and a manufacturer who possesses private forecast information of her
end product. Considering a continuous type space for demand forecast, they showed that an appropriate pay-
back contract can coordinate the SC. In a similar setting, i.e., one-period planning horizon and IA about demand
forecast, Taylor (2006) examined the effect of the retailer’s private information on the manufacturer’s sale-timing
decision. It was shown that the manufacturer, who offers a price-quantity contract for each element of a discrete
demand type space, may prefer to sell close to the selling season if his production cost is low. Kostamis &
Duenyas (2011) studied a SC consisting of a supplier and a manufacturer who has private information over two
dimensions of market demand and his in-house production cost. The authors concluded that with a screening game
with two uncertain dimensions, the SC performance may deteriorate by sharing information. A SC with a retailer
and a supplier who has private information about his unit production cost was analyzed in Çakanyıldırım et al.
(2012). The retailer offers a menu of contracts to the supplier with the assumption that the outside opportunities
of the two different types are not identical. The paper concluded that IA alone does not necessarily induce loss
in channel efficiency.
Table 1 summarizes the literature discussed in this section and positions our paper. Although these studies
incorporate various aspects of SC coordination, their focuses are mainly on the design and analysis of mechanisms
in settings with tightly defined assumptions. Corbett & de Groote (2000) in the EOQ setting, Ha (2001)
and Çakanyıldırım et al. (2012) in a single-period stochastic environment considered one-dimensional private
information about a cost parameter. IA about demand forecast in a single-period setting was analyzed by Özer
& Wei (2006) and Taylor (2006). Assuming a two-dimensional setting, Sucky (2006) studied a coordination
problem with two uncertain cost parameters, while Kostamis & Duenyas (2011) dealt with uncertain market
demand and a cost parameter. The underlying multi-period inventory model in Dudek & Stadtler (2005, 2007)
is similar to ours, but our proposed mechanism is simpler and seems easier to implement than the iterative,
negotiation-like scheme suggested in these papers. Additionally, their negotiation process does not completely
5rule out the possibility of cheating by the buyers.
In contrast to much of the literature in which identical outside options for different retailer’s types are assumed,
we consider the case where the retailer’s outside option depends on his private information. Although Sucky
(2006) and Çakanyıldırım et al. (2012) did not assume a common outside option for different types, both studies
focused on settings where each dimension of private information has a binary type space (i.e., low or high). We
consider a more general setting with a discrete type space for each dimension.
Table 1: Classification of supply chain coordination models with information asymmetry
One-period EOQ ELS IA setting Type space
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Corbett & de Groote (2000) X 1 dim. Continuous
Sucky (2006) X 2 dim. Binary
Dudek & Stadtler (2005) X NA* NA*
Dudek & Stadtler (2007) X NA* NA*
This paper X 2 dim. Discrete
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Ha (2001) X 1 dim. Continuous
Özer & Wei (2006) X 1 dim. Continuous
Taylor (2006) X 1 dim. Discrete
Kostamis & Duenyas (2011) X 2 dim. Binary
Çakanyıldırım et al. (2012) X 1 dim. Binary
* Dudek & Stadtler (2005, 2007) do not fit into these categories as they did not use the mechanism design approach.
3 INDIVIDUAL OPTIMAL PROCUREMENT PLANS
In this paper, we restrict our analysis to a two-echelon serial SC consisting of a risk-neutral supplier who
serves a risk-neutral retailer with a single product. The retailer faces an ELS problem to find an ordering plan
that maximizes his total profit of satisfying external customer demand. The supplier also faces an ELS problem
to find a production plan that maximizes the total profit earned by fulfilling the retailer’s orders.
The ELS model determines the optimal timing and procurement (the term “procurement” is used to cover
both ordering -at the retailer’s level- and production -at the supplier’s level- settings) level in order to satisfy
a deterministic but dynamic demand over a discrete time horizon of finite length. The model can be described
as follows. For a fixed planning horizon of length T , there is a known demand for a single item. This demand
has to be satisfied each period by procurement in this period or in previous periods, i.e., backlogging is not
allowed. Relevant costs include procurement costs and holding (inventory) costs. The procurement costs consist
of a fixed component (e.g., set-up cost) and marginal procurement cost per item. We use the following notation
for the parameters in periods t 2 T = {1, 2, ..., T}:
dt : demand in period t
Kt: fixed procurement cost in period t
pt : unit variable procurement cost in period t
ht : unit holding cost in period t
st : unit selling price in period t.
The objective is to determine how much to procure in each period such that demand is fully met at maximum
profit. There are three decision variables for periods t 2 T = {1, 2, ..., T}:
6xt : procurement quantity in period t
yt : set-up variable in period t, 1 if there is any procurement and 0 otherwise
It : ending inventory in period t.
The basic single-item, uncapacitated ELS problem can be formulated as follows:
max
TX
t=1
(stdt  Ktyt   ptxt   htIt) (1)
s.t. It 1 + xt = It + dt 8t 2 T (2)
xt  ytdt,T 8t 2 T (3)
xt, It   0 8t 2 T (4)
yt 2 {0, 1} 8t 2 T (5)
I0 = 0 (6)
The objective is to maximize profit earned by selling the product minus procurement and inventory holding
costs. We assume that the unit selling price of the supplier’s profit in (1) is equal to the retailer’s unit variable
procurement cost. Demand can be satisfied from procurement in the current period or inventory left over from
previous periods, while remaining items build up the current inventory. This is formalized in (2). Constraints (3)
are the set-up forcing constraints, which together with constraints (5) ensure that the set-up variable is forced to
1 if there is any procurement. As there is no ending inventory in the last period of the optimal solution and costs
are assumed to be non-negative, procurement is limited by the remaining cumulative demand. Note that in this
formulation, ds,t =
Pt
i=s di denotes the cumulative demand from period s up to period t with 1  s  t  T.
Constraints (4) ensure that the procurement quantity and ending inventory are non-negative. Finally, the starting
inventory is assumed to be zero (6).
If the supplier and retailer behave individually rational, they each use the above formulation to maximize their
own profits. These locally optimal plans, however, are not efficient from the system-wide perspective and both
parties can benefit if their procurement decisions are coordinated. We illustrate the ELS problem by an example.
Example 1. Consider that the retailer faces a 5-period ELS problem with the parameters according to Table 2a.
Further assume that the retailer has the market power to impose his individual optimal plan on the supplier.
The optimal solution of the retailer’s problem is to order 26 units in period 1, 25 units in period 2, and 73
units in period 3 with the total profit of 466 units. Now this optimal ordering plan becomes the demand for
the supplier. Table 2b lists the parameters of the supplier’s problem. The supplier’s optimal production plan is
to produce 51 units in period 1 and 73 units in period 3, with the total profit of 286 units. The total SC profit
equals 752 (= 466 + 286) units.
7Table 2: Parameters of the ELS problem
(a) Parameters of the retailer’s problem
t 1 2 3 4 5
dt 26 25 29 33 11
Kt 179 199 282 285 292
pt 15 17 11 15 15
ht 10 16 10 15 13
st 30 21 28 29 25
(b) Parameters of the supplier’s problem
t 1 2 3 4 5
dt 26 25 73 0 0
Kt 327 280 434 450 338
pt 2 1 3 4 3
ht 10 18 11 15 14
st 15 17 11 15 15
4 SUPPLY CHAIN OPTIMAL PROCUREMENT PLAN
To provide a basis for comparison, in this section, we discuss the model for the ideal case of the centralized
SC. In the centralized decision-making setting, a single decision-maker with access to all the required information
aims to determine the joint supplier-retailer procurement plan that maximizes total SC profits. The profit
maximization problem of our SC can be formulated as follows:
max
TX
t=1
[(pRt x
R
t  KSt ySt   pSt xSt   hSt ISt ) + (sRt dt  KRt yRt   pRt xRt   hRt IRt )] (7)
s.t. ISt 1   ISt + xSt = xRt 8t 2 T (8)
IRt 1   IRt + xRt = dt 8t 2 T (9)
xSt  dt,T ySt 8t 2 T (10)
xRt  dt,T yRt 8t 2 T (11)
xRt , x
S
t , I
R
t , I
S
t   0 8t 2 T (12)
yRt , y
S
t 2 {0, 1} 8t 2 T (13)
IR0 , I
S
0 = 0 (14)
In this formulation, the decision variables are divided into two separate sets: supplier (S) and retailer (R).
Based on customer demand, the retailer places an order with the supplier and then, the retailer’s order becomes
the demand {xRt }t2T for the supplier. The inventory balance constraints of the supplier and the retailer are
formalized in (8) and (9), respectively. Constraints (10) and (11) are the set-up forcing constraints. Note that
in constraint (10), the cumulative customer demand of the retailer is considered as an upper bound for the
retailer’s order quantity, which in turn constitutes the demand for the supplier. The objective is to maximize
the joint ordering-production profits at two levels of the SC (7). Zangwill (1969) proposed an efficient dynamic
programming algorithm to solve the cost minimization version of this problem.
Definition 2. We define the efficiency of a SC system under a particular coordination mechanism to be the
fraction by which the gap between the profit of the centralized (⇡Cent) and sequential (⇡Seq) decision-making
settings is reduced. That is, the coordination mechanism efficiency is defined as the difference between the profit
of the coordinated (⇡Co) and sequential setting solutions relative to the difference of the profit associated with
the centralized and sequential setting solutions:
Coordination mechanism efficiency =
⇡Co   ⇡Seq
⇡Cent   ⇡Seq .
8We use this measure in the subsequent sections to quantify the SC profit improvement, resulting from the
implementation of a coordination mechanism.
Example 3. Using the parameters in Table 2, we show the performance of the SC system in the centralized
setting. The optimal plan for both the retailer and supplier is to procure 51 units in period 1 and 73 units in
period 3 with the profit of 465 and 486 units, respectively. The total SC profit is 951 units.
5 OPTIMAL CONTRACT UNDER SYMMETRIC INFORMATION
To capture a more realistic situation, the focus in this section shifts from the centralized setting to the
decentralized SC, where the supplier is in charge of designing a take-it-or-leave-it contract. The assumption
here is that both the supplier and the retailer are in the same position with respect to the information at the
retailer’s end. This means that the supplier knows demand and cost type of the retailer. He can then incorporate
this information into his optimization problem to come up with the procurement plan and the required side
payment in order to influence the retailer’s ordering plan.
The sequence of events is as follows. The supplier and retailer observe customer demand. Knowing the retailer’s
cost type, the supplier can derive the maximum profit that the retailer will earn by satisfying customer demand.
This profit is denoted by ⇡R⇤ in our model. Based on customer demand, the retailer’s optimal profit (⇡R⇤) and his
own cost parameters, the supplier determines his production plan and side payment quantity such that his profit
is maximized. Subsequently, the supplier makes an offer to the retailer in the form of a contract, consisting of a
procurement plan plus a side payment. The retailer either accepts the offer or imposes his optimal ordering plan
on the supplier. The offered contracts in our study have a stationary format. That is, the procurement and side
payment quantities, once determined, do not change throughout the planning horizon. In addition to providing
tractability to the model analysis, this assumption is of particular interest to our problem setting for several
practical reasons. First, contracts with time-varying parameters would be unnecessarily complex, making them
more difficult to implement in practice. Second, modifying contracting terms throughout the planning horizon
may be costly as it may require renegotiations between the SC members and cause planning problems (see Zhang
(2010) for more discussions). Third, our model can be valuable for future research by serving as an initial step
to understand the problem of designing supply contracts with more realistic assumptions.
The total profit that the retailer will realize by satisfying customer demand is denoted by ⇡R. If the retailer
chooses the procurement plan-side payment pair {(xRt )t2T , z} from the supplier’s contract, his total profit is
given by ⇡R + z =
PT
t=1(s
R
t dt  KRt yRt   pRt xRt   hRt IRt ) + z where z is the quantity of side payment. The
supplier needs to ensure that the offered contract is individually rational, i.e., he must guarantee that by accepting
the offered contract, the retailer will earn a profit (weakly) larger than his “outside option”. The retailer’s outside
option in our model is the optimal profit of his individual ordering plan.
The supplier’s design of the optimal contract can be formulated as follows:
max
TX
t=1
(pRt x
R
t  KSt ySt   pSt xSt   hSt ISt )  z (15)
9s.t. ⇡R + z   ⇡R⇤ (16)
⇡R =
TX
t=1
(sRt dt  KRt yRt   pRt xRt   hRt IRt ) (17)
IRt 1 + x
R
t = dt + I
R
t 8t 2 T (18)
xRt  dt,T yRt 8t 2 T (19)
ISt 1 + x
S
t = x
R
t + I
S
t 8t 2 T (20)
xSt  dt,T ySt 8t 2 T (21)
z   0 (22)
xRt , x
S
t , I
R
t , I
S
t   0 8t 2 T (23)
ySt , y
R
t 2 {0, 1} 8t 2 T (24)
IR0 , I
S
0 = 0 (25)
Constraint (16) is the “individual rationality” (IR) or participation constraint to ensure that by accepting the
supplier’s offer the retailer’s gain is at least his outside option. The constraints of the retailer’s individual ELS
problem are formalized in (18) and (19), while those of the supplier are presented in (20) and (21). Constraint (22)
ensures that the side payment quantity is non-negative and constraints (23) to (25) define the range of other
decision variables.
To illustrate that the described problem has a feasible solution, consider the case where z = 0. This implies
that the supplier will not pay any side payment to the retailer to influence his individual optimal plan. The
solution of the model in this situation is the outcome of the decentralized (uncoordinated) SC, where the retailer
imposes his outside option on the supplier and the supplier is forced to satisfy the retailer’s individual optimal
plan.
Observe that we have a maximization problem in which the optimal choice of z would be to set it as small as
possible. In this case, constraint (16) would be binding and therefore the supplier maximizes not only his own
profit, but also the profit of the SC system as a whole. By designing the contract in this manner, the supplier
ensures that the retailer earns his individual optimal profit and extracts all the efficiency gains for himself. This
solution is known as the “first-best” solution. With IA, however, SC optimal profit may not be achieved as shown
in the subsequent sections.
Example 4. Using the parameters in Table 2, the contract that the supplier offers consists of procuring 51 units
in period 1 and 73 units in period 3 plus 1 unit of side payment. The retailer’s profit equals 466 (= 465 + 1).
The optimal plan of the supplier is the same as the retailer’s plan with the total profit of 485 units, and the total
SC profit would be 951 units. As expected, the total SC profit is the same as the profit of the centralized setting
(Example 3) and therefore the efficiency of the coordination mechanism (making a side payment) is 1.
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6 OPTIMAL CONTRACT MENU UNDER ASYMMETRIC COST INFORMATION
Up until this point, we have analyzed the situations in which there is no IA. In this section, we drop the
assumption of full information and analyze a more realistic case where the retailer possesses private information.
We consider the setting where IA arises across one dimension: the supplier is uncertain about the retailer’s cost
type. There is a set of possible cost types that the retailer can have and this set is known to the supplier, i.e.,
the supplier is aware of the possible cost types, but is not aware of the retailer’s actual cost type. He believes
that the retailer can have N types of cost with associated probabilities P cj   0 for j 2 J = {1, 2, ..., N} andPN
j=1 P
c
j = 1. The retailer knows his cost type with certainty.
The situation where the supplier who lacks information moves first and offers a contract can be analyzed using
a so-called “screening game” (see e.g., Chen (2003)). Instead of proposing a single contract as in the symmetric
information case, the supplier offers a “menu of contracts”, letting the retailer choose a specific contract from the
menu, i.e., a “procurement plan-side payment” pair. In this way, the supplier persuades the retailer to truthfully
reveal his type via the contract selected in the menu (self-selection).
Since the retailer has an incentive to misreport his cost parameters so as to receive a higher side payment,
the optimal contracts the supplier offers under symmetric information are not “incentive compatible” under
asymmetric information. Therefore, the supplier needs to ensure that the contract menu he offers does not
lead to a misreport of cost parameters. To eliminate the possibility of cheating by the retailer, we rely on the
“revelation principle” (Myerson 1981), stating that if there is an optimal contract for the supplier, then there
exists an optimal contract which induces the retailer to truthfully reveal his cost type.
The sequence of events is as follows. At the outset, the retailer knows his cost type, unobserved by the
supplier. The retailer and supplier observe customer demand. Knowing the retailer’s possible cost types, the
supplier can compute the retailer’s outside option for each type (⇡R⇤j ). The supplier offers a menu with a
contract {(xj,t)t2T , zj} for each assumed retailer type j such that his expected profit is maximized. The retailer
either selects one of the contracts in the menu, or imposes his own optimal plan on the supplier. The objective
of the optimization problem is to maximize the supplier’s expected profit.
6.1 Formulation
The supplier’s problem of designing the optimal menu can be formulated as follows:
max
NX
j=1
(P cj (
TX
t=1
(pRt x
R
j,t  KSt ySj,t   pSt xSj,t   hSt ISj,t)  zj)) (26)
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s.t. ⇡Rj|j + zj   ⇡R⇤j 8j 2 J (27)
⇡Rj|j + zj   ⇡Rk|j + zk 8j, k 2 J, j 6= k (28)
⇡Rk|j =
TX
t=1
(sRj,tdt  KRj,tyRk,t   pRj,txRk,t   hRj,tIRk,t) 8j, k 2 J (29)
IRj,t 1 + x
R
j,t = dt + I
R
j,t 8t 2 T , 8j 2 J (30)
xRj,t  dt,T yRj,t 8t 2 T , 8j 2 J (31)
xRj,t   yRj,t 8t 2 T , 8j 2 J (32)
ISj,t 1 + x
S
j,t = x
R
j,t + I
S
j,t 8t 2 T , 8j 2 J (33)
xSj,t  dt,T ySj,t 8t 2 T , 8j 2 J (34)
xRj,t 2 Z+ 8t 2 T , 8j 2 J (35)
zj , x
S
j,t, I
R
j,t, I
S
j,t,  0 8t 2 T , 8j 2 J (36)
ySj,t, y
R
j,t 2 {0, 1} 8t 2 T , 8j 2 J (37)
IRj,0, I
S
j,0 = 0 8j 2 J (38)
In this formulation, the decision variables have one additional index: j 2 J = {1, 2, ..., N}, representing the
retailer’s types, e.g., xRj,t denotes the procurement quantity in the contract of retailer type j in period t. The
individual rationality constraint is formalized in (27). Each retailer’s type has different cost parameters, and
therefore it is reasonable to assume that the retailer’s participation constraint is type-dependent. As mentioned
earlier, our type-dependent individual rationality constraint is a major departure from much of the literature in
which identical outside options for different retailer types are assumed (i.e., ⇡R⇤j = ⇡R⇤ for all j 2 J). The main
reason to have such a “simple and debatable” (Laffont & Martimort 2001) assumption is because of analytical
tractability. However, because we use a mathematical programming solution approach, there is no reason to
prefer identical outside options to the more realistic case of type-dependent ones.
Constraints (28) are the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints to ensure that the retailer will be worse off if
he chooses a contract that is not designed for his own cost type.
The profit that the retailer realizes when he is of type j and chooses the designed contract for type k is defined
in (29). The procurement quantities in the contracts offered are not necessarily integer, while we assume that
the supply chain’s final product is indivisible. Constraints (35) restrict the value of procurement quantities to be
integers.
Constraints (32) ensure that the set-up variable is zero if there is no procurement in period t. It is noteworthy
that in the outcomes of the model without considering this constraint, we have found some problem instances
in which there is no procurement but there is a set-up, i.e., xR1,t = 0 but yR1,t = 1 (see Appendix for such
an instance). The explanation is that although a cost is associated with the retailer’s set-up variable, we do not
directly optimize the retailer’s total profit formalized by ⇡Rj|j+zj . The following lemma shows that constraint (32)
can be ignored in case all the retailer’s types have the same fixed procurement cost across the whole planning
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horizon.
Lemma 5. If KRj,t = K for all t 2 T and j 2 J , constraint (32) is redundant.
Proof: We prove the claim assuming two retailer types. It is easy to verify that the lemma holds in the case
that there are more than two types. Suppose that the supplier offers a menu of two contracts, and in the contract
designed for type 1, we have a period t 2 T in which xR1,t = 0 and yR1,t = 1 (there is no procurement but there
is set-up). The relevant IR and IC constraints are:
⇡R1|1 + z1   ⇡R⇤1 (39)
⇡R2|2 + z2   ⇡R⇤2 (40)
⇡R1|1 + z1   ⇡R2|1 + z2 (41)
⇡R2|2 + z2   ⇡R1|2 + z1. (42)
Let ⇡R
0
j|k and z
0
j respectively denote for j, k 2 {1, 2}, the cost and side payment associated with the production
plan in which xR1,t = yR1,t = 0. We set z01 = z1  KR1 and z02 = z2. With z01 and z02, it is clear that:
⇡R
0
1|1 = ⇡
R
1|1 +K
R
1 , ⇡
R0
2|1 = ⇡
R
2|1, ⇡
R0
1|2 = ⇡
R
1|2 +K
R
2 , ⇡
R0
2|2 = ⇡
R
2|2. (43)
With the assumption that KRj,t = K for all t 2 T and j 2 {1, 2}, profits in (43) and side payments associated
with the new production plan satisfy constraints (39) to (42). We therefore have a new feasible solution with a
larger profit.
It is noteworthy that z01 = z1   KR1 is non-negative (satisfies constraint (36)), because ⇡R
0
1|1 is the profit
associated with a feasible solution that cannot be larger than the retailer’s maximum profit ⇡R⇤1 and we also
have
z1   ⇡R⇤1   ⇡R1|1 = ⇡R⇤1   (⇡R1|1 +KR1 ) +KR1 = ⇡R⇤1   ⇡R
0
1|1 +K
R
1   KR1 .
Similar to the model of the previous section, the feasible region of this problem is not empty. Consider the
case where the supplier does not pay any side payment to the retailer, i.e., zj = 0 for all j 2 J . This implies that
constraints (27) would be binding. Additionally, the retailer will not be better off by pretending to be another cost
type since there is no side payment. The solution of the above model is then the outcome of the uncoordinated
SC, where the supplier has no option but to satisfy the retailer’s individual optimal plan.
Example 6. Suppose that the retailer has 2 types of set-up cost shown in Table 3. The optimal ordering
plans of the two types of the retailer and the supplier’s production plan corresponding to each type with and
without coordination are given in Table 4. With the assumption that each retailer cost type arises with the same
probability, the expected profit of the supplier’s outside option is 728.5 (= 1/2[791 + 666]). The total expected
profit of the supplier equals 926 (= 1/2[1418   349] + 1/2[1399   616]), leading to about 27% increase in his
expected profit. Observe that the existence of IA does not allow the supplier to extract all the efficiency gains
for himself. Rather, the supplier is obliged to give up some “information rent” to the retailer because of the
latter’s information advantage. In this example, there is information rent of 40 (= 1331 + 349  1640) units for
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the retailer’s type 1 (the type with the higher set-up cost).
We also compute the expected profit improvement of the whole SC system. The SC profit if the retailer is
actually of type 1 without coordination equals 2431 (= 1640 + 791), while the SC profit with coordination
would be 2749 (= 1680 + 1069). In case the actual retailer cost is type 2, the SC total profit in the case of
sequential decision-making and the coordinated setting would be 3262 (= 2596+666) and 3379 (= 2596+783),
respectively. Therefore, the expected SC profit under coordination is 3064, with about 8% profit improvement
compared to the sequential decision-making setting. The expected SC total profit with a centralized decision-
maker is 3086 (= 1/2[2749 + 3423]), and therefore the expected efficiency of the coordination mechanism is
about 0.91.
Table 3: Two cost types of the retailer
t 1 2 3 4 5
dt 26 25 29 33 77
pRt 15 20 18 10 15
hRt 10 16 10 15 13
sRt 30 30 30 30 30
KR1,t 179 199 282 285 292
KR2,t 29 85 29 43 21
Table 4: Individual and coordinated optimal procurement plans (IA on cost)
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 z Profit
In
di
vi
du
al
pl
an
s
Retailer type 1 51 0 29 33 77   1640
Retailer type 2 26 25 29 33 77   2596
Supplier for retailer type 1 51 0 62 0 77   791
Supplier for retailer type 2 51 0 62 0 77   666
C
oo
rd
in
at
ed
pl
an
s
Retailer type 1 contract 51 0 62 0 77 349 1331
Retailer type 2 contract 51 0 61 1 77 616 1980
Supplier for retailer type 1 51 0 62 0 77   1418
Supplier for retailer type 2 51 0 62 0 77   1399
6.2 Network interpretation
In this subsection, we further analyze the optimization problem formulated in (26) - (38). In particular, the
aim here is to examine which IC constraints are binding at the optimal solution and find a bound for the side
payment quantities when the retailer possesses private information about one of his cost parameters. To do so,
we rely on the rationalizability condition (Rochet 1987) and network interpretation (Vohra 2011) of the set of
IC constraints. In order to demonstrate this interpretation, it is useful to rewrite the IC constraints in (28) as:
zk   zj  ⇡Rj|j   ⇡Rk|j 8j, k 2 J. (44)
Together with the objective of minimizing the zj variables, these constraints coincide with the constraints of
the dual of a longest path problem, where zj corresponds to the length of a longest path. However, since it is
more common to work with a shortest path problem, in our analysis, we consider  zj which corresponds to
the length of a shortest path. In view of this observation, we introduce a vertex j for each type j 2 J . Between
every ordered pair of vertices (k, j), we insert a directed arc of length `(k, j) = ⇡Rj|j   ⇡Rk|j . The IR constraints
can be incorporated by assuming a dummy type of value 0 with z0 = 0. Figure 1 shows a part of this network.
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For a fixed set of procurement plans (xRj )j2J , the set of IC constraints is feasible iff this network has no
negative-length cycle. If the network does have a negative cycle, there is no set of side payments that makes
the procurement plans incentive compatible. In a network without negative-length cycles, each  zj is upper
bounded by the length of the shortest path from the source vertex to vertex j. Therefore the optimal choice of
zj would be to set it equal to minus the the length of the shortest path. To ensure that IR constraints hold, we
choose the source to be the vertex corresponding to the dummy type 0. Arcs on the shortest path tree (union of
all shortest paths from the source to all vertices) correspond to binding IC constraints.
1 2 j j + 1 N
0
⇡R2|2   ⇡R1|2
⇡R1|1   ⇡R2|1
⇡Rj+1|j+1   ⇡Rj|j+1
⇡Rj|j   ⇡Rj+1|j
⇡Rj|j   ⇡R⇤j⇡R1|1   ⇡R⇤1
⇡R2|2   ⇡R⇤2
Figure 1: Network of types
Next, we discuss the relevant IC constraints and identify the ones that are redundant. Before that, we present
two definitions for a set of ordered retailer types with time-invariant private cost information.
Definition 7. Monotonic procurement plans. The definition of monotonic procurement plans varies with the
retailer’s private information:
(a) Suppose the retailer has private information about his holding cost. For ordered holding costs, a contract
menu consists of monotonic procurement plans if the corresponding total ending inventories across the whole
planning horizon are monotonic. That is, if hRj < hRj+1 then
PT
t=1 I
R
j,t  
PT
t=1 I
R
j+1,t.
(b) Suppose the retailer has private information about his set-up cost. For ordered set-up costs, a contract
menu consists of monotonic procurement plans if the corresponding total numbers of set-ups across the whole
planning horizon are monotonic. That is, if KRj < KRj+1 then
PT
t=1 y
R
j,t  
PT
t=1 y
R
j+1,t.************
Definition 8. Local IC constraints. With ordered types, e.g., hRj 1 < hRj < hRj+1, IC constraints can be divided
into two sets: downward IC (DIC) constraints in which the type j retailer chooses the contract designed for a
type with a lower cost and upward IC (UIC) constraints in which type j retailer chooses the contract designed
for a type with a higher cost. Local DIC and UIC constraints are:
⇡Rj|j + zj   ⇡Rj 1|j + zj 1 8j 2 {2, ..., N}
⇡Rj|j + zj   ⇡Rj+1|j + zj+1 8j 2 {1, 2, ..., N   1}.
As mentioned earlier, given a set of procurement plans, we have a way to check whether the plans are
incentive compatible: we need to ensure that the network corresponding to the IC constraints does not contain
negative-length cycles. Theorem 9 shows the necessary and sufficient condition under which there is no negative-
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length cycle between a pair of vertices. Consequently, Theorem 11 shows that with ordered types, the global IC
constraints are implied by the local ones.
Theorem 9. A network of types associated with the system (44) does not contain negative-length cycles between
pairs of vertices iff the procurements plans in a menu of contracts are monotonic.
Proof: We prove the claim for the case of IA on the retailer’s holding costs. A similar argument can be
used to prove the claim for other private cost parameters. Consider the non-negative cycle condition applied to
cycle j ! j + 1! j in Figure 1. With the assumption of time-invariant holding cost, it implies:
`(j, j + 1) + `(j + 1, j)   0, ⇡Rj+1|j+1   ⇡Rj|j+1 + ⇡Rj|j   ⇡Rj+1|j   0
,
TX
t=1
(sRt dt  KRt yRj+1,t   pRt xRj+1,t   hRj+1IRj+1,t) 
TX
t=1
(sRt dt  KRt yRj,t   pRt xRj,t   hRj+1IRj,t)+
TX
t=1
(sRt dt  KRt yRj,t   pRt xRj,t   hRj IRj,t) 
TX
t=1
(sRt dt  KRt yRj+1,t   pRt xRj+1,t   hRj IRj+1,t)   0
,
TX
t=1
(hRj+1   hRj )IRj,t  
TX
t=1
(hRj+1   hRj )IRj+1,t   0
, (hRj+1   hRj )(
TX
t=1
IRj,t  
TX
t=1
IRj+1,t)   0,
TX
t=1
IRj,t  
TX
t=1
IRj+1,t.
The proof for a cycle on a pair of non-consecutive vertices, i.e., j ! j + k ! j, k > 1 is similar.
Next, we show that the retailer’s revenue has a specific property which will be used to simplify the set of IC
constraints.
Lemma 10. The retailer’s revenue ⇡Rj|k for types j, k 2 J satisfies the increasing differences property.
Proof: The claim that we need to prove varies with the retailer’s private information. We need to show that
given two ordered types of retailer and two monotonic procurement plans, xRj and x
R
k , we have
⇡Rk|k0   ⇡Rj|k0   ⇡Rk|j0   ⇡Rj|j0 , (45)
where
(a) the retailer has private information about his holding cost and hRj0 < h
R
k0 ,
(b) the retailer has private information about his set-up cost and KRj0 < K
R
k0 .
We prove the claim in part (a). The proof of part (b) is similar. After substituting in the expression for ⇡Rj|k
and canceling common terms, the inequality (45) is equivalent to:
(hRk0   hRj0)(
TX
t=1
IRj,t  
TX
t=1
IRk,t)   0,
which holds by the monotonicity of total ending inventory quantities and the fact that hRj0 < h
R
k0 .
Theorem 11. Suppose that procurement plans are monotonic and therefore ⇡Rj|k satisfies increasing differences.
Only the local IC constraints matter out of all the IC constraints.
Proof: We prove the claim for the case of IA on holding cost. A similar argument can be used to prove the
claim for private set-up cost. With ordered types, i.e., hRj 1  hRj , we show that only the local DIC constraints
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are sufficient. To do so, we show that the following pair of constraints:
⇡Rj|j + zj  ⇡Rj 1|j + zj 1 (46)
⇡Rj 1|j 1 + zj 1  ⇡Rj 2|j 1 + zj 2 (47)
imply that ⇡Rj|j + zj   ⇡Rj 2|j + zj 2. The rest of DIC constraints will follow by induction and non-negativity
of cycles in the network. Adding (46) and (47) and rearranging yields
⇡Rj|j + zj   (⇡Rj 1|j   ⇡Rj 2|j)  (⇡Rj 1|j 1   ⇡Rj 2|j 1) + ⇡Rj 2|j + zj 2.
The increasing differences property and monotonicity of total ending inventories imply that
(⇡Rj 1|j   ⇡Rj 2|j)  (⇡Rj 1|j 1   ⇡Rj 2|j 1)   0,
and therefore we have
⇡Rj|j + zj   ⇡Rj 2|j + zj 2.
Using similar arguments, we can show that global UIC constraints are implied by the local ones.
Theorems 9 and 11 imply that we can replace the set of IC constraints with the corresponding monotonicity
requirement of procurement plans (see Definition 7) together with the set of local IC constraints.
To summarize, when a set of procurement plans is incentive compatible (there is no negative-length cycle
in the network of types), minus the length of the shortest path to a vertex (type) is the side payment quantity
that the supplier pays to the retailer while preserving incentive compatibility. To find all the shortest paths from
vertex 0 to each vertex j 2 J , instead of taking into account the full set of IC constraints, we have shown that it
is sufficient to only consider the subset of local IC constraints. This means that it is sufficient to ensure that each
retailer type has no incentive to make a “small” misreport of his type. This property enables us to considerably
reduce the number of IC constraints from a quadratic number of n(n   1) constraints to a more tractable set
with a linear number of 2(n  1) constraints.
Example 12. Suppose the retailer has private information about his time-invariant holding cost. The supplier
assumes 4 possible cost parameters for the retailer, arising with the same probability: hR1 = 1, hR2 = 5, hR3 = 10,
and hR4 = 32. Table 5 shows demand and other cost parameters of the retailer. The supplier’s cost parameters
are given in Table 2b. The network corresponding to this example is depicted in Figure 2. The dashed arcs form
the shortest path tree and show the binding IC and IR constraints. Considering the length of the shortest path
from vertex 0 to each vertex, we have z1   117, z2   299, z3   79 and z4   0. Table 6 shows the optimal
menu of contracts.
Table 5: Parameters of the retailer’s problem in Example 12
t 1 2 3 4 5
dt 26 25 29 33 11
KRt 150 89 182 165 198
pRt 5 6 7 5 9
sRt 15 20 22 21 19
17
1 2 3 4
0
402
182
420
 220
827
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0  220  79 0
Figure 2: Network of types in Example 12
Table 6: Optimal menu of contracts in Example 12
Contract x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 z ⇡Rj,j ⇡R⇤j
Retailer type 1 124 0 0 0 0 117 1434 1434
Retailer type 2 51 0 73 0 0 299 932 1152
Retailer type 3 26 54 0 44 0 79 952 1031
Retailer type 4 26 25 29 33 11 0 899 899
Note that with the simplifying assumption that the outside options of different retailer types are identical, i.e.,
⇡R⇤j = ⇡R⇤ for j 2 J , there is only one outgoing arc from vertex 0 which goes to the vertex corresponding to the
most inefficient (the one with the highest cost) type. Because if a menu of contracts allows an inefficient type to
reach his outside option, it will be automatically the case for the efficient types that have lower costs. Then the
shortest path tree rooted at vertex 0 must be a unique path of 0! N ! ...! 2! 1. This implies that zN =
 (⇡RN |N  ⇡R⇤N ) and for each type j < N, the side payment is equal to zj =  
P
jrN 1(⇡
R
r|r ⇡Rr+1|r)+zN .
In this case, the problem is considerably simplified as the zj variables can be eliminated from the formulation
by rewriting them in terms of the retailer’s profit. As shown in Figure 2, in the absence of a common outside
option, any of the arcs rooted at vertex 0 can be part of the shortest path tree.
The next step that we take is to examine whether the set of IC constraints can be further reduced. Consider
Example 12 and observe that the horizontal dashed arcs in Figure 2 correspond to the local upward IC (or
LUIC) constraints in which the efficient type pretends to be inefficient. This observation is commonly used in the
mechanism design literature to further reduce the set of IC constraints and uncover some (qualitative) properties
of optimal contracts. Although we can show in our setting that the total profit of the designed contract for an
efficient type is not smaller than the profit of an inefficient type, i.e., ⇡Rj|j+zj   ⇡Rj0|j0 +zj0 for j, j0 2 J, j < j0,
this does not allow us to conclude that the efficient type’s information rent (⇡Rj0|j0 + zj0   ⇡R⇤j0 ) is in general
(weakly) larger than the information rent of the inefficient type. Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility
that the inefficient type pretends to be efficient. This unexpected result can be attributed to the consideration of
the dependence between the retailer’s private information and his outside option. The next example shows an
instance in which the inefficient type pretends to be efficient. The consequence of this observation is that no
further simplification of the set of IC constraints is possible in our setting.
Example 13. Suppose the retailer has private information about his time-invariant holding cost. The supplier
assumes 2 possible cost parameters with the same probability: hR1 = 4.9, hR2 = 7.6. We have hSt = hS = 1,
pRt = p
S
t = p = 0, and sRt = sR = 5. Table 7 shows demand and set-up cost of the retailer and supplier. The
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associated network of types is illustrated in Figure 3. The dashed arc from vertex 1 to 2 represents the binding
IC constraint in which type 2 (inefficient type) chooses the contract designed for type 1 (efficient type). Table 8
shows the optimal menu. Observe that the inefficient type’s information rent is 1 unit while there is no rent for
the efficient type.
Table 7: Parameters of the problem in Example 13
t 1 2 3 4 5
dt 5 6 12 6 20
KSt 151 40 186 50 190
KRt 38 38 38 38 38
Table 8: Optimal menu of contracts in Example 13
Contract x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 z ⇡Rj,j ⇡R⇤j
Retailer type 1 11 0 12 6 20 8.6 63.6 72.2
Retailer type 2 5 6 12 6 20 1 55 55
1 2
0
7.6
8.6
 8.6 0
Figure 3: Network of types in Example 13
7 OPTIMAL CONTRACT MENU WITH TWO DIMENSIONS OF INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
Rather than only having one-dimensional uncertainty about a cost parameter, in this section we analyze the
case that the supplier is uncertain about an additional dimension: another cost parameter or customer demand
at the retailer’s level. While most of the studies with IA in the operations management literature analyze the
problems with private information about either cost parameters or demand, in this section, we consider both cost
and demand uncertainty. To the best of our knowledge, the study by Kostamis & Duenyas (2011) is the only
exception in the literature with IA about both a cost parameter and market demand. Although the two dimensions
of IA in this study is similar to ours, our analysis differs in two important ways. First, we have a multi-period
model with a discrete, rather than a binary, type space for each dimension. Second, we do not assume a common
outside option for all the retailer types.
In subsection 7.1, we formulate the supplier’s problem of designing optimal contract menus with two dimen-
sions of IA. Next, subsection 7.2 presents the network interpretation.
7.1 Formulation
As in the previous section, suppose that the supplier is uncertain about a cost parameter. He believes that
the retailer can have N cost types with the associated probabilities P cj   0 for j 2 J = {1, 2, ..., N} andPN
j=1 P
c
j = 1. In 7.1.1, we present the formulation of the two-dimensional IA setting where customer demand
is also uncertain. This is followed by the discussion of the model with private set-up and holding cost information
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in 7.1.2. The type of the retailer throughout this section is identified by a pair of indices, each representing a
dimension of private information.
7.1.1 Asymmetric cost and demand information:
The supplier believes that the retailer can have M demand scenarios with the associated probabilities P di   0
for i 2 I = {1, 2, ...,M} and PMi=1 P di = 1. The retailer knows his demand scenario with certainty. With the
assumption that demand and cost types are independent, the supplier’s beliefs satisfy Pi,j = (P di )(P cj ) for i 2 I,
j 2 J and Pi2I,j2J Pi,j = 1.
Incorporation of demand uncertainty in the model requires us to keep track of shortages that may occur at the
retailer’s level. We consider the case where there are stockouts, i.e., demand is not satisfied or backlogged but
lost. We introduce a new decision variable and a new parameter. LR,i,ji0,j0,t is the quantity of unsatisfied demand in
period t of retailer type (i, j), who chooses the contract designed for the retailer of type (i0, j0). Parameter sRj,t
accounts for the stockout cost of the retailer of type j in period t. Stockout costs are not easy to quantify and
typically measured by the selling price (see e.g., Aksen et al. (2003)).
In this model, the retailer’s inventory level depends not only on the actual cost type and demand scenario,
but also on the chosen contract: IR,i,ji0,j0,t denotes the ending inventory level in period t of retailer type (i, j) who
chooses the contract designed for the retailer type (i0, j0).
The retailer’s revenue in a period t is the product of the realized sales and the corresponding unit selling price.
The realized sale in period t is given by di,t LR,i,ji0,j0,t, demand minus shortage in period t. With the assumption
that sRj,t denotes the unit revenue in period t, the retailer’s revenue is
P
t2T s
R
j,tdi,t.
The sequence of events is as follows. At the beginning, the retailer knows his cost type, unobserved by
the supplier. The retailer observes customer demand. Being aware of the possible cost and demand types, the
supplier computes the optimal ordering profit of the retailer for each type (⇡R⇤i,j ). Then he offers a menu of
“procurement plan-side payment” contracts {(xi,j,t)t2T , zi,j} for each pair of assumed retailer type (i, j) such
that his expected profit is maximized. The retailer either selects one of the contracts in the menu or imposes his
own optimal plan on the supplier.
As the supplier moves first and offers a menu of contracts, he needs to consider the retailer’s reaction to the
proposed offer in his optimization problem. Therefore, in the current setting with two dimensions of private
information, the supplier’s optimization problem entails a nested (bi-level) optimization task that corresponds to
the retailer’s optimization problem. The upper level optimization task corresponds to the supplier’s problem, and
the lower level optimization task corresponds to the retailer’s problem.
In the model with one dimension of private cost information, we do not need to consider a bi-level optimization
problem since by choosing a contract, the retailer’s optimal procurement plan, and hence the corresponding
inventory levels are fully specified. However, this is not the case in the setting with demand uncertainty. Given
both the procurement quantities in the chosen contract (which is not targeted to his real type) and the real demand
scenarios, the retailer needs to determine how much demand to lose, when to lose this demand, and how much
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inventory to hold in each period such that his total profit is maximized. That is, the optimal quantities of yRi,j,t,
LR,i,ji0,j0,t, and I
R,i,j
i0,j0,t need to be specified.
The supplier’s bi-level optimization problem can be formulated as:
max
MX
i=1
NX
j=1
Pi,j(
TX
t=1
(pRt x
R
i,j,t  KSt ySi,j,t   pSt xSi,j,t   hSt ISi,j,t)  zi,j) (48)
s.t. ⇡R,i,ji,j + zi,j   ⇡R⇤i,j 8i 2 I, 8j 2 J (49)
⇡R,i,ji,j + zi,j   ⇡R,i,ji0,j0 + zi0,j0 8i, i0 2 I, 8j, j0 2 J (50)
ISi,j,t 1 + x
S
i,j,t = x
R
i,j,t + I
S
i,j,t 8t 2 T , 8i 2 I, 8j 2 J (51)
xSi,j,t  max
k2I
{dk,1,T }ySi,j,t 8t 2 T , 8i 2 I, 8j 2 J (52)
xRi,j,t 2 Z+ 8t 2 T , 8i 2 I, 8j 2 J (53)
zi,j , x
S
i,j,t, I
S
i,j,t   0 8t 2 T , 8i 2 I, 8j 2 J (54)
ySi,j,t 2 {0, 1} 8t 2 T , 8i 2 I, 8j 2 J (55)
ISi,j,0 = 0 8i 2 I, 8j 2 J (56)
in which ⇡R,i,ji,j is the outcome of the following optimization problem:
⇡R,i,ji0,j0 = max
TX
t=1
(sRj,tdi,t  KRj,tyRi0,j0,t   pRt xRi0,j0,t   hRj,tIR,i,ji0,j0,t   sRj,tLR,i,ji0,j0,t) 8i, i0 2 I, 8j, j0 2 J (57)
s.t. IR,i,ji0,j0,t 1 + x
R
i0,j0,t = di,t + I
R,i,j
i0,j0,t   LR,i,ji0,j0,t 8t 2 T , 8i, i0 2 I, 8j, j0 2 J (58)
xRi,j,t  max
k2I
{dk,1,T }yRi,j,t 8t 2 T , 8i 2 I, 8j 2 J (59)
LR,i,ji0,j0,t  di,t 8t 2 T , 8i, i0 2 I, 8j, j0 2 J (60)
IR,i,ji0,j0,t, L
R,i,j
i0,j0,t   0 8t 2 T , 8i, i0 2 I, 8j, j0 2 J (61)
yRi,j,t 2 {0, 1} 8t 2 T , 8i 2 I, 8j 2 J (62)
IR,i,ji0,j0,0 = 0 8i, i0 2 I, 8j, j0 2 J (63)
The decision variables in this bi-level problem have one more index i 2 I = {1, 2, ...,M}, representing
demand scenarios. For instance, xRi,j,t is the procurement quantity in the contract of the retailer type (i, j) in
period t. ⇡R,i,ji0,j0 (in (57)) is the profit of the retailer of type (i, j) who chooses the contract for the retailer
type (i0, j0). In the set-up forcing constraints (52) and (59), the maximum total demand across all the possible
demand scenarios is considered as an upper bound for the procurement quantities in each period t. Constraints
(60) ensure that the retailer’s stockout quantity in period t does not exceed the demand of that period.
To transform the bi-level optimization problem into a single-level problem, we consider the lower level
(retailer’s) problem in more detail. For clarity, we leave out all the subscripts and superscripts representing
the retailer types. The retailer’s optimization problem is as follows:
max
yt,It,Lt
TX
t=1
(stdt  Ktyt   ptxt   htIt   stLt) (64)
21
s.t. It 1 + xt + Lt = dt + It 8t 2 T
xt  ytd1,T 8t 2 T
Lt  dt 8t 2 T
It, Lt   0 8t 2 T
yt 2 {0, 1} 8t 2 T
I0 = 0
In this formulation, xt is given in the contract. The retailer also knows his real demand scenario and he solves
the above integer linear program to find the optimal quantities of yt, Lt, and It.
Next we demonstrate that the retailer’s optimization problem can be written as a system of linear (in)equalities.
The following theorems show that there is one unique optimal solution, satisfying the property that LtIt = 0
for t 2 T . First, Theorem 14 shows that we have an optimal solution such that there is no ending inventory in
a given period if demand is not fully satisfied in that period. In order for this property to hold, we need a mild
assumption on the retailer’s cost parameters.
Assumption 1. There is no speculative motive for the retailer to postpone satisfying demand, i.e., the stockout
cost of one unit of demand in some period plus the cost of holding one unit inventory until some future period
is at least the stockout cost in the latter period:
Pv 1
j=t hj + st   sv .
Theorem 14. Given Assumption 1, there exists an optimal solution such that LtIt = 0 for t 2 T .
Proof: By substituting the inventory balance constraint It 1+xt+Lt = dt+ It into the objective function
in (64), we have
TX
t=1
(stdt  Ktyt   ptxt   htIt   st(dt + It   It 1   xt))
=
T 1X
t=1
 (ht + st   st+1)It   (hT + sT )IT  
TX
t=1
(Ktyt + (pt   st)xt)
The aim is to maximize this function and since ht + st   st+1   0 under assumption 1, we need to have
the optimal value of It as small as possible and non-negative. This implies that we should satisfy as much of
demand as we can and therefore we will have8><>:L
⇤
t = 0 and I⇤t = I⇤t 1 + xt   dt if I⇤t 1 + xt   dt > 0
I⇤t = 0 and L⇤t = dt   I⇤t 1   xt if I⇤t 1 + xt   dt  0
(65)
This implies that we have an optimal solution with the desired property.
We proved that the optimal solution has a specific property, the following theorem shows that there is indeed
one solution that satisfies the property.
Theorem 15. There exists only one feasible solution that satisfies LtIt = 0 for t 2 T .
Proof: Any feasible solution should satisfy the inventory balance constraint
22
It 1 + xt + Lt = dt + It 8t 2 T .
Consider period 1 in which I0 = 0 and thus the inventory balance constraint would be L1 = I1 + d1   x1.
The quantity of x1 is specified in the contract and the retailer knows his demand d1. The quantity of L1 can be
uniquely specified using (65). There exists only one feasible solution in period 1 that has the desired property.
Now I1 is specified, x2 and d2 are known, and what remains is to determine the value of L2 and I2 in a similar
way. Following the same reasoning for the subsequent periods, we can show that in each period t 2 T , there
exists only one feasible solution that satisfies LtIt = 0.
To ensure that there is no optimal solution that does not satisfy Theorem 14, we assume that by holding
inventory, the retailer certainly will incur holding cost, i.e., ht > 0 for t 2 T .
The above theorems can be used to rewrite the retailer’s problem as a system of linear (in)equalities. We can
enforce that the property of the unique optimal solution of the retailer’s problem (LtIt = 0, 8t 2 T ) holds in
the optimization problem of the supplier. To do so, we introduce two new binary variables:
ui,ji0,j0,t : 1 if L
R,i,j
i0,j0,t > 0 and 0 otherwise
vi,ji0,j0,t : 1 if I
R,i,j
i0,j0,t > 0 and 0 otherwise.
To have the desired property, we also consider new constraints as follows:
LR,i,ji0,j0,t  maxk2I {dk,1,T }u
i,j
i0,j0,t 8t 2 T , 8i, i0 2 I, 8j, j0 2 J (66)
IR,i,ji0,j0,t  maxk2I {dk,1,T }v
i,j
i0,j0,t 8t 2 T , 8i, i0 2 I, 8j, j0 2 J (67)
ui,ji0,j0,t + v
i,j
i0,j0,t  1 8t 2 T , 8i, i0 2 I, 8j, j0 2 J (68)
ui,ji0,j0,t, v
i,j
i0,j0,t 2 {0, 1} 8t 2 T , 8i, i0 2 I, 8j, j0 2 J (69)
Instead of a bi-level optimization problem, the supplier solves the single-level MIP, consisting of (48) - (63)
plus (66) - (69), in order to find his optimal menu of contracts.
Two remarks are in order regarding this single-level MIP model. (1) Similar to the one-dimensional model,
in order to have a correct formulation, we need to consider the set of constraints xRi,j,t   yRi,j,t, 8t 2 T , 8i 2
I, 8j 2 J in the supplier’s problem. These constraints are redundant if all the retailer’s types have the same
fixed procurement cost across the whole planning horizon, i.e., KRj,t = K for t 2 T and j 2 J . (2) Following
the reasoning in Section 6, the feasible region of this problem is not empty.
Example 16. Suppose that there are 2 demand scenarios with equal probability of 0.5 according to Table 9. The
retailer’s time-invariant holding cost of type 1 and type 2 are 3.4 and 8.7 units, respectively. Other cost parameters
are given in Table 10. Table 11 shows the individual and coordinated optimal procurement plans. The expected
supplier’s outside option equals 329.5 (= 1/4[234.4  3.4 + 485.5 + 601.5]). The supplier’s expected profit with
coordination equals 932.2 (= 1/4[[641.2 157.3]+[681.8 179.7]+[1598.8 257.4]+[1588.8 187.4]]), leading
to approximately 3 times larger profit for the supplier. The expected SC total profit with respect to the 4 possible
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combinations of cost type and demand scenario when there is no coordination is 601, while the expected profit
with coordination equals 1203.7. In the ideal case with a centralized decision-maker, the expected SC total profit
equals 1213.5 and therefore the expected coordination mechanism efficiency is about 0.98.
To investigate the effect of one and two-dimensional IA on the retailer’s profit, consider the retailer type (2, 1)
in Example 16. This retailer type, which has high demand and low holding cost (“strong” in both dimensions),
would prefer a situation where his cost is known to the supplier to a situation where both his cost and demand
are private information since 114.5 + 257.4 < 137.4 + 351.0 (see Table 12). Kostamis & Duenyas (2011)
demonstrated that more dimensions of IA are not always preferable for the retailer. In particular, they showed
that a type who is strong in one dimension but week in the other would sometimes prefer to get screened along
his weak dimension. Our observation, however, corresponds to the type that is strong in both dimensions.
Table 9: Demand scenarios in Example 16
t 1 2 3 4 5
d1,t 47 57 58 47 53
d2,t 55 86 84 85 128
Table 10: Cost parameters in Example 16
(a) Cost parameters of the supplier
t 1 2 3 4 5
hSt 2.4 5.8 5.1 1.4 2.5
KSt 126.3 261.2 127.6 124.3 206.8
pSt 5.7 3.0 3.0 5.4 6.6
(b) Cost parameters of the retailer
t 1 2 3 4 5
sRt 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2
KRt 78.0 88.0 92.0 65.0 67.0
pRt 8.9 7.1 10.0 11.4 11.5
Table 11: Individual and coordinated optimal procurement plans (IA on demand and cost)
Demand scenario 1 Demand scenario 2
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 z Profit x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 z Profit
In
di
vi
du
al Retailer type 1 47 115 0 0 0   216.4 55 170 0 0 0   371.9
Retailer type 2 47 57 0 0 0   175.8 55 86 84 0 0   321.9
Supplier for retailer type 1 47 115 0 0 0   234.4 55 170 0 0 0   485.5
Supplier for retailer type 2 47 57 0 0 0    3.4 55 86 84 0 0   601.5
C
oo
rd
in
at
ed Retailer type 1 contract 47 115 0 47 53 157.3 59.1 55 86 94 75 128 257.4 114.5
Retailer type 2 contract 47 57 58 47 53 179.7  3.9 55 86 84 85 128 187.4 134.5
Supplier for retailer type 1 47 115 0 100 0   641.2 55 86 94 203 0   1598.8
Supplier for retailer type 2 47 57 58 100 0   681.8 55 86 84 213 0   1588.8
Table 12: Coordinated optimal procurement plans (IA on demand)
Cost type 1
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 z Profit
Retailer type 1 contract 47 57 158 0 0 466.6  246.8
Retailer type 2 contract 47 75 139 0 0 351.0 137.4
7.1.2 Asymmetric set-up and holding cost information:
The supplier believes that the retailer can have M set-up cost types with associated probabilities P di   0 for
i 2 I = {1, 2, ...,M} and PMi=1 P di = 1. The retailer knows his set-up cost with certainty. With the assumption
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that set-up and holding cost types are independent, the supplier’s beliefs satisfy Pi,j = (P di )(P cj ) for i 2 I,
j 2 J and Pi2I,j2J Pi,j = 1.
The sequence of events is as follows. At the beginning, the retailer knows both his set-up and holding cost
type, unobserved by the supplier. Being aware of the possible cost types, the supplier computes the optimal
profits of the retailer for each type (⇡R⇤i,j ). Then he offers a menu of “procurement plan-side payment” contracts
{(xi,j,t)t2T , zi,j} for each pair of assumed retailer types (i, j) such that his expected profit is maximized. The
retailer either selects one of the contracts in the menu or imposes his own optimal plan on the supplier.
The supplier’s problem of designing the optimal menu can be formulated as follows:
max
MX
i=1
NX
j=1
Pi,j(
TX
t=1
(pRt x
R
i,j,t  KSt ySi,j,t   pSt xSi,j,t   hSt ISi,j,t)  zi,j) (70)
s.t. ⇡R,i,ji,j + zi,j   ⇡R⇤i,j 8i 2 I, 8j 2 J (71)
⇡R,i,ji,j + zi,j   ⇡R,i,ji0,j0 + zi0,j0 8i, i0 2 I, 8j, j0 2 J (72)
⇡R,i,ji0,j0 =
TX
t=1
(sRt dt  KRi,tyRi0,j0,t   pRt xRi0,j0,t   hRj,tIR,i,ji0,j0,t) 8i, i0 2 I, 8j, j0 2 J (73)
IR,i,ji0,j0,t 1 + x
R
i0,j0,t = dt + I
R,i,j
i0,j0,t 8t 2 T , 8i, i0 2 I, 8j, j0 2 J (74)
xRi,j,t  dt,T yRi,j,t 8t 2 T , 8i 2 I, 8j 2 J (75)
xRi,j,t   yRi,j,t 8t 2 T , 8i 2 I, 8j 2 J (76)
ISi,j,t 1 + x
S
i,j,t = x
R
i,j,t + I
S
i,j,t 8t 2 T , 8i 2 I, 8j 2 J (77)
xSi,j,t  dt,T ySi,j,t 8t 2 T , 8i 2 I, 8j 2 J (78)
xRi,j,t 2 Z+ 8t 2 T , 8i 2 I, 8j 2 J (79)
zi,j , x
S
i,j,t, I
S
i,j,t, I
R,i,j
i0,j0,t   0 8t 2 T , 8i, i0 2 I, 8j, j0 2 J (80)
ySi,j,t, y
R
i,j,t 2 {0, 1} 8t 2 T , 8i 2 I, 8j 2 J (81)
ISi,j,0, I
R,i,j
i0,j0,0 = 0 8i, i0 2 I, 8j, j0 2 J (82)
We impose a restriction on the form of the offered contracts: we assume that with stationary cost parameters
for both the retailer and supplier, the set of procurement plans satisfy the property of a “consistent contract”.
While it is challenging to show analytically, the findings from our extensive numerical study indicate that the
optimal contracts do satisfy this property. This is also corroborated by the fact that it is an intuitive property to
consider for the set of contracts and easy to formalize.
Definition 17. Consistent contracts. Consider the case where the retailer has private information about his set-
up and holding cost. A contract is consistent if (a) for a fixed set-up cost, the number of set-ups across the whole
planning horizon increases as holding cost increases, i.e., for each KRi , if hRj < hRj0 then
P
yRi,j,t 
P
yRi,j0,t;
(b) for a fixed holding cost, the total quantity of ending inventories across the whole planning horizon increases
as set-up cost increases, i.e., for each hRj , if KRi < KRi0 then
P
IR,i,ji,j,t 
P
IR,i
0,j
i0,j,t .
The consistent contract property can be easily incorporated into the supplier’s problem as follows:
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i, j i, j0
i0, j i0, j0
Figure 4: Network of types with two dimensions of private information
TX
t=1
yRi,j,t 
TX
t=1
yRi,j0,t 8i 2 I, 8j, j0 2 J, j < j0 (83)
TX
t=1
IR,i,ji,j,t 
TX
t=1
IR,i
0,j
i0,j,t 8i, i0 2 I, i < i0, 8j 2 J (84)
Note that the consideration of consistent contracts does not lead to an empty feasible region as the outside
option of each type (i, j) is a feasible solution that satisfies the consistency property (see Van Hoesel &
Wagelmans (2000)). An example of this setting is given in Subsection 7.2.
7.2 Network interpretation
In this subsection, we take a closer look at the model with IA on two cost parameters. We discuss the relevant
IC constraints and identify the redundant ones. Throughout this subsection we assume that the retailer’s private
information, i.e., his holding and set-up cost as well as the unit procurement cost are time-invariant.
To structure our analysis, we first classify the set of IC constraints as follows. A retailer type is a pair of (i, j)
where i is the set-up cost and j is the holding cost and KRi0 > K
R
i , while hRj0 < h
R
j . The set of IC constraints
in (72) can be divided into eight sets as follows:
• Vertical upward IC (VUIC) constraints: The retailer type (i, j) chooses the contract designed for type
(i0, j) where i0 > i: ⇡R,i,ji,j + zi,j   ⇡R,i,ji0,j + zi0,j
• Vertical downward IC (VDIC) constraints: The retailer type (i0, j) chooses the contract designed for
type (i, j) where i0 > i:
⇡R,i
0,j
i0,j + zi0,j   ⇡R,i
0,j
i,j + zi,j
• Horizontal downward IC (HDIC) constraints: The retailer type (i, j) chooses the contract designed for
type (i, j0) where j0 < j:
⇡R,i,ji,j + zi,j   ⇡R,i,ji,j0 + zi,j0
• Horizontal upward IC (HUIC) constraints: The retailer type (i, j0) chooses the contract designed for
type (i, j) where j0 < j:
⇡R,i,j
0
i,j0 + zi,j0   ⇡R,i,j
0
i,j + zi,j
• Diagonal downward IC (DDIC) constraints: The retailer type (i0, j0) chooses the contract designed for
type (i, j) where i0 > i and j0 < j:
⇡R,i
0,j0
i0,j0 + zi0,j0   ⇡R,i
0,j0
i,j + zi,j
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• Diagonal upward IC (DUIC) constraints: The retailer type (i, j) chooses the contract designed for type
(i0, j0) where i0 > i and j0 < j:
⇡R,i,ji,j + zi,j   ⇡R,i,ji0,j0 + zi0,j0
• Off-diagonal downward IC (ODDIC) constraints: The retailer type (i0, j) chooses the contract designed
for type (i, j0) where i0 > i and j0 < j:
⇡R,i
0,j
i0,j + zi0,j   ⇡R,i
0,j
i,j0 + zi,j0
• Off-diagonal upward IC (ODUIC) constraints: The retailer type (i, j0) chooses the contract designed for
type (i0, j) where i0 > i and j0 < j:
⇡R,i,j
0
i,j0 + zi,j0   ⇡R,i,j
0
i0,j + zi0,j
In addition to the previously considered IC constraints in the one-dimensional case, the two-dimensional setting
requires us to consider new diagonal IC constraints.
Next, we simplify the set of IC constraints. Theorems 18 and 19 respectively show under which conditions
the horizontal and vertical IC constraints are satisfied. The sufficiency of local upward/downward horizontal and
vertical IC constraints is shown in Theorem 20.
Theorem 18. A set of procurement plans satisfies HUIC and HDIC constraints iff it is monotonic in the holding
cost (j) component.
Proof: With a fixed set-up cost (KRi ) and hRj0 < h
R
j , consider the non-negative cycle condition applied to
cycle (i, j) ! (i, j0) ! (i, j) in Figure 4. Given the assumption of time-invariant procurement, holding and
set-up cost, it implies:
(⇡R,i,j
0
i,j0   ⇡R,i,j
0
i,j ) + (⇡
R,i,j
i,j   ⇡R,i,ji,j0 )   0
,
TX
t=1
(sRt dt  KRi yRi,j0,t   pRt xRi,j0,t   hRj0IR,i,j
0
i,j0,t ) 
TX
t=1
(sRt dt  KRi yRi,j,t   pRt xRi,j,t   hRj0IR,i,j
0
i,j,t )
+
TX
t=1
(sRt dt  KRi yRi,j,t   pRt xRi,j,t   hRj IR,i,ji,j,t ) 
TX
t=1
(sRt dt  KRi yRi,j0,t   pRt xRi,j0,t   hRj IR,i,ji,j0,t )   0
,
TX
t=1
hRj0(I
R,i,j0
i,j,t   IR,i,j
0
i,j0t ) +
TX
t=1
hRj (I
R,i,j
i,j0,t   IR,i,ji,j,t )   0. (85)
We know that IR,i,j
0
i,j,t = I
R,i,j
i,j,t and I
R,i,j0
i,j0t = I
R,i,j
i,j0,t . Therefore, (85) is equivalent to
TX
t=1
(hRj0   hRj )(IR,i,j
0
i,j,t   IR,i,j
0
i,j0t )   0,
TX
t=1
IR,i,j
0
i,j,t 
TX
t=1
IR,i,j
0
i,j0t .
Theorem 19. A set of procurement plans satisfies VUIC and VDIC constraints iff it is monotonic in the set-up
cost (i) component.
Proof: With a fixed holding cost (hRj ) and KRi0 > K
R
i , consider the non-negative cycle condition applied
to cycle (i, j)! (i0, j)! (i, j) in Figure 4. With stationary cost parameters for the retailer, it is easy to verify
that the theorem holds by substituting in the expression for ⇡R,i,ji,j and canceling common terms.
Theorem 20. Out of all the horizontal and vertical downwards constraints, only the local downward constraints
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relating (i+1,j) and (i,j), and relating (i,j+1) and (i,j) matter. Only the local upward constraints relating (i,j)
and (i+1,j), and (i,j) and (i,j+1) matter out of all the horizontal and vertical upward constraints.
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 11 in Section 6.
The next theorem shows the redundancy of diagonal IC constraints.
Theorem 21. The upward / downward diagonal IC constraints are implied by the relevant horizontal and vertical
IC constraints. More specifically, (a) the DDIC constraints relating type (i0, j0) to (i, j) where KRi0 > K
R
i and
hRj0 < h
R
j :
⇡R,i
0,j0
i0,j0 + zi0,j0   ⇡R,i
0,j0
i,j + zi,j (86)
are implied by the HUIC and VDIC constraints, and (b) the DUIC constraints relating type (i, j) to (i0, j0)
where KRi0 > K
R
i and hRj0 < h
R
j :
⇡R,i,ji,j + zi,j   ⇡R,i,ji0,j0 + zi0,j0 (87)
are implied by HDIC and VUIC constraints.
Proof: We prove the claim in part (a). The proof of part (b) is similar. There are two sets of HUIC and VDIC
constraints that can be considered to prove the claim. We use the HUIC constraint, relating (i, j0) and (i, j),
and VDIC constraint, relating (i0, j0) and (i, j0). Note that we could have used the other set (VDIC constraint,
relating (i0, j) and (i, j) and HUIC constraint, relating (i0, j0) and (i0, j)) to prove the claim with a similar
argument.
Consider the HUIC and VDIC constraints:
⇡R,i,j
0
i,j0 + zi,j0  ⇡R,i,j
0
i,j + zi,j
⇡R,i
0,j0
i0,j0 + zi0,j0  ⇡R,i
0,j0
i,j0 + zi,j0 .
By adding these two inequalities and rearranging we have:
⇡R,i
0,j0
i0,j0 + zi0,j0   ⇡R,i
0,j0
i,j   zi,j   (⇡R,i,j
0
i,j   ⇡R,i,j
0
i,j0 )  (⇡R,i
0,j0
i,j   ⇡R,i
0,j0
i,j0 ). (88)
After substituting in the expression for ⇡R,i
0,j0
i0,j0 and canceling common terms, the right-hand-side of (88) is
equivalent to
TX
t=1
(KRi  KRi0 )(yRi,j0,t   yRi,j,t).
It is a non-negative value under the assumption of consistent contracts and therefore we have
⇡R,i
0,j0
i0,j0 + zi0,j0   ⇡R,i
0,j0
i,j   zi,j   0,
which is equivalent to (86) and proves the claim.
To summarize, all the global HDIC, HUIC, VDIC, VUIC plus all the (local and global) DUIC and DDIC
constraints are not relevant at the optimal solution. Consider for instance the situation where M = N = 4. To
find all the shortest paths from the dummy vertex (0, 0) to each vertex and therefore determine the side payment
quantities, we only need to consider a subset of 120 IC constraints instead of the full set with 240 constraints.
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Example 22. Suppose that the retailer has private information about his holding and set-up costs. The supplier
assumes 2 stationary set-up and holding costs, arising with the same probability: hR1 = 9.5, hR2 = 6.2, KR1 =
154.7, and KR2 = 280.3. Other cost parameters are SR = 18, PR = 7.1, KS = 563.2, hS = 3.7, and PS = 8.8.
Demand is given by d = (37, 74, 34, 79, 18). Figure 5 illustrates the network of types in this example. For clarity,
we only show the binding IR and IC constraints. Minus the length of the shortest path from the dummy type
(0, 0) to each type is a lower bound for the optimal side payment quantities. Table 13 shows the optimal menu
of contracts. Observe that a type which is inefficient in two dimensions (e.g., high set-up and holding cost) may
pretend to be efficient in both dimensions and the other way around. It is, however, not profitable for a low
set-up cost and high holding cost to pretend to have high set-up and low holding cost and vice versa.
1, 1 1, 2
2, 1 2, 2
0, 0
 16.3  80.9
 364.5
38
Figure 5: Network of types in Example 22
Table 13: Optimal menu of contracts in Example 22
Contract x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 z ⇡Rj,j ⇡R⇤j
Retailer type (1,1) 37 74 34 97 0 16.3 1848.0 1864.3
Retailer type (1,2) 41 104 0 97 0 97.2 1826.5 1907.4
Retailer type (2,1) 37 108 0 97 0 59.2 1302.9 1345.6
Retailer type (2,2) 145 0 0 97 0 461.7 1085.2 1474.5
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This paper studies the supplier’s problem of eliciting cooperation from a strong retailer who has one or
two-dimensional private information about customer demand or his cost parameters. Both the SC members in
our analysis are facing a multi-period lot-sizing problem with dynamic and deterministic demand. The supplier
uses a simple and easily implementable coordination mechanism, offering a menu of contracts, to influence the
retailer’s ordering plan and the retailer either accepts one of the contracts or imposes his optimal plan. Each
dimension of private information in this study has a discrete type space and the retailer’s outside option depends
on his private information.
The complexities of a multi-period inventory model, coupled with the intricacies of IA between SC members
make the design of optimal supply contracts a nontrivial task. Given the opportunistic reaction of the retailer to
the proposed offer, the supplier is facing a nested (bi-level) optimization problem. We have shown that, with a
specific assumption on the retailer’s cost parameters, this problem can be transformed into a single-level MIP
by exploiting the structural properties of optimal solutions at the lower level (retailer) problem.
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Assuming a discrete type space, as opposed to the common binary space in the literature, for the retailer’s
private information, we presented a network interpretation for the set of incentive compatibility constraints that
allows us to analyze the problem from an intuitive graph theoretic viewpoint. In particular, we have shown that
a bound for the side payment quantities can be found by considering a shortest path tree which consists of
the participation and local incentive constraints. This implies that with a considerably simpler set of incentive
constraints, in terms of the number of relevant constraints, we can find the optimal side payment quantities.
A surprising finding in our study is related to the possible reaction of an opportunistic retailer. Following a
sensible and well-known result in the one-dimensional mechanism design literature, one can expect that it is
in the interest of an efficient (e.g., with a lower cost) retailer type to pretend to be inefficient (e.g., a higher
cost) and not the other way around. This implies that the supplier’s problem becomes easier as he only needs to
consider the efficient type’s incentive constraints in order to find the optimal contract menu. However, we showed
that it is possible to have an optimal solution in which the supplier gives up some strictly positive information
rent to the inefficient type and zero rent to the efficient one. This unexpected result can be attributed to the
consideration of the more realistic and fundamentally different assumption of type-dependent outside options.
In the two-dimensional cost IA and considering a binary type space for each dimension with equal probabilities,
we showed that a type that is inefficient in two dimensions (e.g., high set-up and holding cost) may pretend to
be efficient in both dimensions and the other way around. It is, however, not profitable for a low set-up cost
and high holding cost to pretend to have high set-up and low holding cost and vice versa. It was previously
shown in the literature that a retailer who is strong in one dimension (e.g., high demand) but weak (e.g., high
cost) in the other would sometimes prefer a situation where his weak dimension is known to the supplier to a
situation where both dimensions are private information. With an example, we demonstrated that it might be in
the interest of a retailer type who is strong in both dimensions that one of the private dimensions is known to
the supplier.
This paper focused on the analysis of a coordination problem with two dimensions of private information and
a discrete type space for each dimension. A natural next step would be to consider more types (i.e., assume a
continuous type space per dimension). Increasing the number of types, however, does not lead to uncovering new
results of qualitative significance. In fact, the complexities of the coordination setting and models in place have
already made it hardly possible to draw more results for a discrete type space. This limitation is also pointed out
by Çakanyıldırım et al. (2012) and Fudenberg & Tirole (1991), asserting that the problem with more than two
types and type-dependent outside options is analytically difficult and does not lead to general results. Another
more interesting extension to our study would be to consider more dimensions of private information for the
retailer. For instance, our type-dependent outside option assumption is an important step towards enhancing our
understanding of a situation which comes closer to reality. This understanding can be taken to the next level by
assuming that the retailer possesses private information about his outside option.
Regarding the number of contracts in the offered menu, the revelation principal says that the supplier needs to
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offer a contract for each retailer type. We are in the process of designing the so-called “pooling” or “bunching”
contracts where each contract is intended to appeal to more than one type of retailer. This is specifically useful
when there are a large variety of retailer types.
The supplier’s coordination mechanism in this study, i.e., making a side payment, can be easily modeled as
a profit-sharing or an all-unit discount mechanism. It would be interesting to evaluate the performance of other
coordination mechanisms such as different rebate and holding cost compensation schemes. Coordination in more
complicated settings including a SC with more tiers and more players at each tier can be considered as another
direction for extending the current study.
APPENDIX
Example 23. In this example, we show the necessity of constraint (32). Suppose that the retailer has two set-up
cost types, KR1,t = KR1 = 282 and KR2,t = KR2 = 73 arising with the same probability. The supplier’s cost
parameters are the same as the ones in Table 2b and other cost parameters of the retailer are given in Table 14.
The optimal solutions of the supplier’s problem described in (26) to (38) with and without constraint (32) are
shown in Table 15. Without the constraint, in the procurement plan of type 2 retailer in period 4, we have
xR2,4 = 0 but yR2,4 = 1. This corresponds to a practically infeasible case where the retailer does not order but has
to pay a set-up cost in that period.
Table 14: Parameters of the retailer’s problem in Example 23
t 1 2 3 4 5
dt 26 25 29 33 27
hRt 10 16 10 15 13
pRt 15 17 11 17 15
sRt 30 30 30 30 30
Table 15: Optimal menu of contracts in Example 23
Retailer type 1 Retailer type 2
with (32) without (32) with (32) without (32)
t xR1,t y
R
1,t x
R
1,t y
R
1,t x
R
2,t y
R
2,t x
R
2,t y
R
2,t
1 51 1 51 1 50 1 51 1
2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
3 62 1 62 1 62 1 62 1
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
5 27 1 27 1 27 1 27 1
z 0 0 251 259
⇡Rj,j 922 922 1484 1476
⇡R⇤j 922 922 1735 1735
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